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We use a matched firm-employee data set to examine the extent of compliance
with minimum wage and overtime pay regulations in Chinese formal sector firms.
We find evidence that there is broad compliance with legal minimum wages in
China; fewer than 3.5% of full-time workers earn less than the legal monthly
minimum wage. On the other hand, we find evidence that there is substantial
non-compliance with overtime pay regulations; almost 29% of the employees
who work overtime are not paid any additional wage for overtime hours, and 70%
are paid less than the legally-required 1.5 times the regular wage.
JEL codes: J3, J8, O17
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Compliance1 Introduction
In recent years, as the Chinese economy has become more market and export ori-
ented, Chinese central and regional governments have actively intervened in the labor
market in attempts to ensure that low wage workers benefit from the resulting rapid
economic growth. A key intervention in the labor market has been legal minimum
wages. In this paper we study minimum wages and two related labor market interven-
tions to protect the pay of low wage workers in China: additional pay for overtime
hours and legally-mandated wage supplements for dangerous work, night work, pen-
sions and other social protections. We use a matched firm-employee data set to exam-
ine the extent to which these regulations are complied with in Chinese formal sector
firms. We also identify which types of workers, in which types of firms, are most likely
to be affected by legal minimum wages and other legal pay protections.
We find evidence that there is broad compliance with the monthly minimum
wage in China. Specifically, compared to other developing countries, we find very
few full-time workers in our sample, (fewer than 3.5%), earn less than the legal
monthly minimum wage, even after adjusting for legally-mandated wage supple-
ments. On the other hand, we find evidence that there is substantial non-
compliance with overtime pay regulations. Almost 29% of the employees who work
overtime hours are not paid any additional wage for overtime hours, and if they are2015 Ye et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
ommons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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the regular wage. Over 40% of the employees who work overtime are paid less than
1.5 times the minimum wage for overtime work, and 70% are paid less than 1.5
times their regular wage for overtime work.
Minimum wages in China are set at the local government level, and there are dozens
of different minimum wages across the country. Ours is the first study of minimum
wages in China to use details of the earnings that firms report being paid to individual
workers to estimate which workers are paid at or below the specific local minimum
wage that applies to that worker and firm; other studies use either aggregated province-
level data or worker’s self-reported earnings from household surveys. These detailed
earnings data allow us to get a more precise estimate of the relationship between the
minimum wage and different components of the wage paid to workers in China.
Most of the empirical studies of the impact of recent minimum wage changes in
China have focused on the potentially negative impact on employment. The results of
these studies have been mixed, and where negative employment effects have been de-
tected they are small. Our paper suggests two reasons why minimum wages seem to
have a small impact in China even though there is broad compliance with minimum
wage laws. First, we find that the market wage of the vast majority of full-time workers
in China is above the monthly minimum wage. Second, our results suggest that when
minimum wages are binding employers respond to an increase in minimum wages by
increasing hours worked rather than reducing the number of workers they employ. Be-
cause non-compliance with overtime pay regulations is widespread, increasing working
hours does not necessarily increase labor costs to employers.
We find that the relationship between minimum wages and the wages paid to
workers depends on what “wage” is considered. Workers in formal sector firms in
China are paid a “basic wage” plus supplements for transportation, risk, etc., plus a
bonus related to productivity. All workers with the same position in the same firm
(who do the same job) receive the same basic wage, which is determined prior to per-
forming the work. Wage supplements, some legally-mandated and some at the discre-
tion of the employer, are also determined before performing the work. Bonuses, on the
other hand, depend on performance, may differ between workers in the same position
in the firm, and are not determined until after the work is performed. Minimum wages
appear to be taken into consideration by many firms when setting the basic wage. We
find that basic wages are set at exactly the minimum wage for a relatively large fraction
of workers. However, once bonuses and supplements are taken into account, almost all
full-time workers earn more than the monthly minimum wage. We also find that there
is a positive correlation across regions in China between the minimum wage and the
basic wage. On the other hand, we find that there is a negative correlation between the
minimum wage and the bonus. For most workers, the higher basic wage and lower
bonus cancel each other out and the minimum wage is not significantly correlated
with the total full-time wage. Only for workers in the most labor-intensive firms are
higher minimum wages significantly correlated with higher total full-time wages.
The firms where workers are most likely to be affected by legal minimum wages are
disproportionately export-oriented firms with owners from Hong Kong, Taiwan or
Macao and which are located in the more developed eastern Chinese provinces such
as Guangdong.
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supplements in China
Prior to 1994, China had no minimum wage regulations. In 1993, the first regulations
on minimum wages were issued by the Labor Ministry of China (the “Enterprise
Minimum Wage Regulations”). In July 1994, a minimum wage was written into China’s
new version of the Labor Law. Clause 48 of that law states that all types of enterprises
in China should comply with paying local minimum wages.
In 2004, the Enterprises Minimum Wage Regulations were replaced by more general
Minimum Wages Regulations issued by the Department of Labor and Social Security.
In these regulations the adjustment frequency of minimum wages was set to be at least
once every two years and coverage was extended to town-village enterprises, to em-
ployees in micro-enterprises, and to part-time workers. Penalties for violations were in-
creased substantially from an earlier range of 20–100% of the wage that was owed to a
new range of 100–500% of the wage that was owed. Restrictions were also placed on
what employers could include as part of the wage when comparing to the minimum
wage (Wang and Gunderson, 2012). In determining if the wage is above the legal mini-
mum, employers must not include overtime pay and legally-mandated supplements to
the wage such as those for night shifts and dangerous environmental conditions such
as high temperature, low temperature, underground working conditions and working
in poisonous or noxious conditions.1
There is no unified minimum wage level for the entire nation. Instead, the task of set-
ting minimum wages is delegated to the local governments. Clause 48 of the 1994 labor
law requires that local governments set the minimum wage according to five principles:
local minimum living expenses; the average wage level; local productivity; unemploy-
ment; and local economic development. In practice, each province-level government
determines several possible minimum wage levels that could be adopted by local gov-
ernments, generally three to five levels, according to local economic conditions and liv-
ing standards. Then each prefectural city-level government within the province-level
administrative area chooses the appropriate minimum wage levels from this published
list, also based on local economic conditions and living standards. The law provides
considerable flexibility for provinces and prefectural cities in setting their minimum
wages. Typically, urban and suburban counties within a prefectural city have different
minimum wage levels.2 Consequently, not only each province-level administrative area,
but also each prefectural city-level administrative area, may have multiple county-level
minimum wages. In 2009, the year covered by our data, over 41 different minimum
wages were set in 31 different localities.3
The monthly minimum wage is based on a 40 h work week. According to labor regu-
lations passed in 1994, laborers shall work no more than 8 h per day, 5 days per week.
After consultation with trade unions and workers, a firm can extend the work day. If
workers work more than the legal maximum of 40 h per week, they must be paid at
least 150% of the wage they receive for regular hours, at least 200% of the regular wage
if the overtime is on a “day of rest” (weekend), and at least 300% the regular wage if the
overtime is on a statutory holiday. Fines for violating overtime pay regulations include
back pay plus an additional 50–100% of the wage owed.
The main mechanism for enforcing minimum wage and overtime regulations is in-
spections by the government labor authorities. If a violation is found during an
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and require the firm to correct the violation (i.e., pay back pay owed to the worker).4 If
firms correct the violation, no further action is taken.5 If firms do not correct the viola-
tion within a specified time, a fine may be imposed. If the firm neither corrects the vio-
lation nor pays the fine, then the case may be referred to the judicial authorities. In
practice, almost all firms found to be in violation of minimum wage or overtime pay
regulations correct the violation after a warning; very few firms are required to pay
fines and almost none are referred to the judicial authorities.6
Labor enforcement efforts are concentrated in the period around the Chinese New
Year and explicitly focus on firms that employ a large proportion of rural migrants.
Many workers in manufacturing firms in China are rural migrants who leave the cities
for home during the New Year’s holiday and then return to the cities when the holidays
are over. Inspections are concentrated in this period because bonuses, which can be a
significant fraction of total pay, are paid to workers at the end of the year (before the
holiday) and because worker contracts are most likely to be negotiated around this
time. In the current year the inspection period was from November 24, 2014 to Febru-
ary 10, 2015 (New Year is February 19, 2015) and was conducted in three stages. In the
first stage (November 24 to December 5) labor authorities mounted a publicity cam-
paign to remind workers and firms of the legal rights of workers. In the second stage
(December 6 to February 5) firms with a high proportion of rural migrant employees
were inspected and, where necessary, ordered to make corrections. In the third stage,
from February 6 to February 10, the inspections and their results are reviewed. Very
few firms are inspected at any other time of year. In practice, inspections outside of the
New Year period or in firms that do not employ a high fraction of rural immigrants
occur only if a complaint is filed by workers.7
The Labor Law of the Chinese Peoples Republic usually includes minimum wages,
overtime pay and contract violations of pay in the same clauses.8 Consistent with this,
the labor authorities we interviewed tell us that labor inspections focus on detecting vi-
olations of minimum wage, overtime pay regulations and violations of written con-
tracts. We found no evidence that minimum wages laws are enforced more strictly
than overtime pay regulations, or vice-versa. As we note above, fines for violating mini-
mum wage legislation can be larger than those for violating overtime pay regulations (a
maximum of 500% of the wage for violating minimum wage laws but only 100% for
violating overtime pay regulations). However, as most firms simply correct violations if
they are found, and few firms pay fines, it is not likely that this difference in fines will
be important in the decisions of firms. Overall, labor inspections appear to enforce both
minimum wages and overtime legislation, although the effective penalties for violating
either regulation are low.
The monthly minimum wage does not apply to part-time workers. Instead, in 2004
the government mandated a separate hourly minimum wage for part-time workers. Be-
cause employers are not required to pay some non-wage benefits for part-time workers,
the part-time hourly minimum wage is set above the monthly minimum wage for full-
time workers (or, more specifically, the monthly minimum wage divided by the number
of hours worked per month by a full-time worker). For this reason, it is not appropriate
to compare the hourly wage of full-time workers to the hourly legal minimum wage for
part-time workers when examining compliance.
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wages have been increasing since 1995, but generally minimum wage increases tend to
be lower than increases in average wages or per capita GDP (Su and Liu, 2006). Mini-
mum wages generally cannot cover basic living expenses (Han and Wei, 2005; Su and
Liu, 2006). A comparison of minimum wage/average wage ratio between China and
OECD countries was made by Jia (2014). Since 2000, the minimum wage/average wage
ratio in OECD countries has been increasing gradually, while this ratio of China has
been decreasing sharply. As of 2009, this ratio in OECD countries was well above 35%,
while in China this ratio was only a little more than 20%.
3 Literature review
There have been relatively few empirical studies examining evidence of non-
compliance with minimum wage and overtime pay regulations among a wide range of
Chinese firms. As noted in the last section, because of the complex nature of minimum
wages in China and confusion about what should or should not be included as “earn-
ings” when comparing earnings to minimum wages, this is not a trivial task. Fang and
Lin (2013), using the annual Urban Household Survey from 2002 to 2009, find that the
proportion of civilian employees (excluding self-employed and students) whose total
monthly wage is below the minimum wage is 5.6%. Yang et al. (2014), using a survey of
internal migrants from 2011 to 2012, estimate that approximately 5% of migrants earn
at or below the monthly minimum wage.
While these nationally-representative empirical studies suggest broad compliance
with minimum wage laws in China, there are several studies that present anecdotal evi-
dence that compliance with minimum wages in China is far from complete (i.e., Rawski
2006; Li, 2007). Other studies present empirical evidence of possible non-compliance
when hours of work are taken into account, but only for a sub-set of Chinese workers
and firms. For example, Xie (2010) surveys 485 rural migrants in three cities in Jiangsu
province in 2009, finding that the proportion of workers whose total monthly wage is
below the monthly minimum wage is 3.9%. However, he also notes that many rural
migrants work more than the legally-mandated 40 h per week. To take into account
overtime hours, Xie (2010) calculates an hourly wage and compares that to an im-
plicit hourly minimum wage based on the monthly minimum wage divided by the
number of hours worked by a full-time worker in a month, finding that over 25% of
workers in his sample earn less than the hourly minimum wage when overtime
hours are taken into account. When he also takes into account that overtime hours
should be paid 1.5 times the regular minimum wage (and 2.0 times the regular
minimum wage for weekend hours), the percent who earn less than the minimum
wage increases to over 60%.
Sun and Shu (2011) study rural migrants in 9 cities in Guangdong province in 2006,
2008, 2009 and 2010. They find that the proportion of workers whose monthly wage is
less than the monthly minimum wage is 9.0, 7.7, 4.0 and 4.2%, respectively, in these
4 years. However, when they take into account overtime hours, they find that the pro-
portion of workers whose hourly wage is below the implicit hourly minimum wage for
full-time workers was 45.3, 33.3, 28.1 and 23.8%. Du and Wang (2008) use data from
five capital cities in Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xi’an in 2001 and 2005
and find that the monthly wage is below the monthly minimum wage for 11.2% of
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full-time workers for 52.2% of workers.
Most of the empirical studies of the impact of recent minimum wage changes in
China have focused on the potentially negative impact on employment. The evidence
from research on the employment impacts of minimum wages in China is mixed, with
some studies finding a negative effect, some finding no effect, and others finding a posi-
tive effect. When detected, negative employment effects tend to be relatively small.
Whether or not a negative impact is found often depends on which types of workers or
firms are examined. Generally, studies that focus on less-skilled workers are more likely
to find a negative employment impact. For example, Fang and Lin (2013) find a nega-
tive employment effect for low-skilled workers, defined as those with a secondary
school education or less, but no employment effect for more educated workers, for
young adults but not older adults, for women but not men, and for workers whose
earnings were between the old and new minimum wages. Jia (2014) find a negative im-
pact on the employment of women but not men. Several studies find evidence that
higher minimum wages led to a decrease in the employment of rural migrants (who
tend to be less skilled) but not for permanent urban residents (Ding, 2010; Wang and
Gunderson, 2011, 2012; Li and He, 2010; Fang and Lin, 2013).9 Ma et al. (2012) find
that higher minimum wages are more likely to affect workers in labor intensive firms
and firms with lower asset per worker ratios. Sun et al. (2013) use firm-level data to
show that increases in the minimum wage are likely to have a larger impact on firms
dependent on exports, firms which also tend to be labor intensive.
Many studies also find regional differences. For example, Fang and Lin (2013) find
that higher minimum wages have a significant negative impact on the employment of
some types of workers in the more-developed and faster growing Eastern regions, a
lagged negative impact in the Central regions, and no statistically significant impact in
any type of workers in the least-developed West. Ni et al. (2008)) also find negative em-
ployment effects in the Eastern provinces but not in the West. Ding (2010) finds a lar-
ger negative employment impact of higher minimum wages in the most-developed
Guangdong province compared to Fujian province. In contrast, Wang and Gunderson
(2011, 2012) find no significant negative employment effect on private sector employ-
ment in the East, although Wang and Gunderson (2012) find evidence of a small lagged
negative employment effect on privately-owned firms in the Central region of China.
Regional differences may be due to the mix of state-owned and privately-owned busi-
nesses in the different regions. For example, while Wang and Gunderson (2011) do not
find a significant negative impact of minimum wages among private sector firms in
Eastern China, they do find evidence of a positive employment impact in state-owned
firms. Wang and Gunderson (2011) argue that the positive employment effect in state-
owned firms may be because these firms act as monopsonists. The East region has a
much higher percentage of privately-owned firms than the Central or Western Region,
and this might explain the lack of a negative employment effect in the East found by
many studies that do not distinguish between state-owned and privately-owned firms.
This suggests that it is important to present results separately for firms with different
ownership, something we do in our paper.
As with the impact of minimum wages on employment, the results of studies of the
impact of minimum wages on wages in China are mixed. Wang and Gunderson (2012)
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ern China. Yang and Gunderson (2014) find statistically significant positive impacts of
minimum wages on the monthly wages of migrant workers in Western China but not
Eastern China, and among rural migrants but not urban migrants. They attribute the
positive effect of minimum wages in the West to the prevalence of state-owned firms
in that region.
Yang and Gunderson (2014) also note that many migrant workers work more than
the full-time maximum of 40 h per week, often without additional pay. While Yang and
Gunderson (2014) do not find evidence of a negative employment effect of minimum
wages, they do find evidence that faced with higher minimum wages, employers extend
working hours. Jia (2014) also present evidence that higher minimum wages cause firms
in Eastern China to increase hours worked. Yang and Gunderson (2014) contend that
workers who are forced to work additional overtime hours are paid less than the legal
minimum wage. To support this contention they present evidence that higher mini-
mum wages are correlated with lower hourly wages.4 Data
The data used in this paper are firm-employee matched data for the year 2009. These
data were collected in 2010 by a team from Beijing Normal University headed by Shi Li
and including Linxiang Ye, two co-authors of this article. To construct the sample of
firms, 6 provinces from different regions in China were chosen. These provinces are
Guangdong, Shandong, Beijing and Jiangsu in the East, Hubei in the Central and
Shaanxi in the West. Then in each province three to five prefectural cities were chosen.
Generally, the capital prefectural city of the province,10 one medium-developed prefec-
tural city, and one least-developed prefectural city are included from each province.
Last, in every prefectural city, enterprises were randomly chosen. After cleaning the
data, we have data on 2835 enterprises from 6 provinces 39 prefectural cities, and 249
counties. 80% of the workers in our sample work in Eastern provinces, 11.6% in the
Central province of Hubei and 2.8% in the Western province of Shanxi.
The majority of firms in the survey are in manufacturing (52.7% of firms, represent-
ing 65.9% of workers). Of workers in manufacturing, 8.2% are in apparel and textile
manufacturing, 6.9% in electronic equipment manufacturing and 50.8% are in other
manufacturing. Our sample also includes workers in firms in wholesale and retail trade
(10.6% of workers), construction (8.5%), transportation, storage and postal services
(7.3%), financial services (2.6%) and electricity, gas and water (5.1%).11
The number of employees in each firm surveyed ranges from 1 to 41,500. 17% of
firms have fewer than 20 workers, 50% of firms have fewer than 91 workers, 90% of
firms have fewer than 729 workers, and less than 3% of firms have more than 2373 em-
ployees. 77% of firms are classified as small firms (below 300 workers), 20.3% as
medium sized firms (between 300 and 2000 workers), and 2.7% as large firms (more
than 3,000 workers). For small firms, all workers in each firm are surveyed, except for
those who were hired or fired in 2009. For medium and large firms, where there are
many people in the same position/occupation, a sample of employees at each position/
occupation were surveyed. Our data set includes information on 521,501 full-time em-
ployees. In general, our data captures only formal sector firms.
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etc.), the average number of employees, enterprise size, revenue, profit, total costs,
labor cost, wage expenditure, payment to workers social insurance, training expend-
iture, labor protection expenditure, and a housing expense allowance. Employee-level
variables are defined for the entire year of 2009 and include: wages, sex, age, education
attainment, occupation, position, the type of employment, the type of labor contract,
are or are not the member of a labor union, wages, and working hours.
Our employee-level data provide not only total yearly wage but also its different wage
components: basic wage, bonus, supplements, and overtime pay. Bonuses can differ be-
tween individuals and are based on the productivity of workers. Supplements are given
to all workers with certain job characteristic, such as those who work night hours or
who have more years of tenure in the firm. Information on pay is the yearly total. We
divide this yearly total by 12 to construct a monthly pay variable. In comparing wages
to the legal minimum wage it is important to use the correct measure of wages. Legally,
the wage compared to the minimum wage should include the basic wage plus bonus
plus some, but not all, supplements. Overtime pay, the employer contribution to social
insurance, and some legally-mandated supplements should be excluded. Other wage
supplements that should be excluded when comparing wages to the minimum wage in-
clude those for working the night shift and working under dangerous or uncomfortable
working conditions. Wage supplements that should be included when comparing wages
to the minimum wage are those that are not legally mandated, and include those for
medical and health benefits, for tenure, meal allowances, transportation supplements,
supplements for books and newspapers, and cost of living adjustments. However, our
data only report total supplements paid to workers. That is, we cannot distinguish be-
tween supplements that are legally required to be included in the minimum wage and
those legally excluded. Because we cannot distinguish which part of reported supple-
ments should or should not be included when comparing to the minimum wage, when
we calculate the proportion of full-time workers earning less than the monthly mini-
mum wage, we present two estimates: the proportion earning less than the basic wage
plus bonus (an upper bound) and the proportion earning less than the basic wage plus
bonus plus supplements (a lower bound).
We have noted that the existing literature suggests that while employers pay most
workers the monthly legal minimum wage, many may violate over-time pay regulations.
Our data allow us to separate out overtime pay from regular pay so that we can obtain
separate and precise estimates of non-compliance with minimum wage and overtime
pay regulations.
Table 1 presents the distribution of these components of the wage for workers in our
sample with different characteristics. Overall, 65% of the wage paid to workers is classi-
fied as the basic wage, 20% of wages are attributed to bonuses, 7.6% from overtime pay,
and 6.7% from supplements. Less-skilled workers (younger, less-educated and less expe-
rienced) receive a higher proportion of their pay as overtime pay and a lower propor-
tion as bonus. Workers in private firms with owners from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao
or a foreign country are also more likely to receive a higher proportion of their pay as
overtime pay and a lower proportion as bonus. Workers in state-owned firms and
more-skilled workers receive a larger fraction of their pay from bonuses and a smaller
fraction from overtime pay.







All 65.3 20.4 6.7 7.6 100
Gender
Male 64.3 21.3 7.1 7.4 60.7
Female 66.8 19.1 6.1 8.0 39.3
Educational attainment
College or above 64.4 23.9 8.1 3.6 9.8
Junior college 65.5 22.5 7.3 4.7 16.4
High school 64.9 20.5 7.0 7.7 42.9
Junior high school or below 66.1 18.1 5.5 10.2 30.9
Age cohort
Age 16–20 61.0 17.3 6.8 14.9 4.9
Age 21–25 64.2 19.7 7.2 8.8 15.9
Age 26–30 65.2 20.1 6.9 7.8 19.2
Age 31+ 65.9 21.0 6.5 6.6 60.1
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 64.9 17.9 7.0 10.2 26.8
Experience 4–6 64.4 19.9 6.5 9.1 15.3
Experience 7–9 68.0 18.2 6.0 7.7 9.6
Experience 10+ 65.2 22.4 6.7 5.7 48.3
Position in firm
Office work 67.2 18.3 7.0 7.5 10.3
Manual worker with junior skill certificate 67.0 20.3 5.0 7.7 14.1
Manual worker with no skill certificate 65.8 17.9 6.4 9.8 40.2
Others 62.9 24.0 7.4 5.8 35.4
Firm ownership
State funded firm 56.4 28.4 10.8 4.5 15.4
Non-state domestic funded firm 67.4 20.6 5.7 6.3 61.5
HongKong,Taiwan,Macao funded firm 67.0 10.6 7.7 14.6 7.8
Foreign funded firm 64.9 16.8 6.1 12.3 15.4
Firm size
Large 58.3 28.0 7.0 6.7 29.5
Medium 65.1 19.3 6.9 8.6 43.3
Small 73.2 14.0 6.0 6.9 27.3
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 67.2 16.4 3.6 12.9 8.2
Communications equipment and computer
manufacturing other electronic equipment
59.6 15.0 8.9 16.4 6.9
Other manufacturing 64.0 21.5 6.7 7.8 50.8
Electricity, gas and water production 57.5 27.0 11.8 3.7 5.1
Construction 77.9 13.4 5.6 3.1 8.5
Transportation, storage and post service 59.5 24.9 8.6 7.1 7.3
Wholesale and retail trade (commerce) 71.8 19.6 4.6 4.1 10.6
Financial service 56.3 27.4 5.0 11.3 2.6
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Table 1 Percent of total earnings (including overtime pay) from different sources (Continued)
Region
Beijing 62.7 24.3 7.3 5.6 14.0
Jiangsu 65.2 19.3 5.9 9.6 28.1
Shandong 68.2 21.5 5.3 5.0 28.9
Hubei 59.5 26.6 8.8 5.1 16.6
Guangdong 63.5 9.9 10.6 15.9 9.6
Shaanxi 90.1 0.0 0.0 9.9 2.8
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performance-related compensation does not permanently increase base pay but must
be re-earned to receive again. Pay-for-performance systems may promote worker prod-
uctivity through two main mechanisms. First, they provide an incentive for employees
to work more efficiently. Second, they can help attract and retain highly productive
workers who may earn more than in firms where every worker receives the average
value of their marginal product (Durham and Bartol, 2003).
Since the implementation of its economic reforms in 1978, pay-for-performance wage
systems have been introduced widely and intensively in China (Warner, 1996). “As a
critical part of the wage system revolution, an increasing number of public and private
organizations in China have introduced PFP. Over the 15-year period from 1978 to
1993, piecework wage and bonuses as a percentage of total pay of Chinese employees
increased from 3.1 to 23.3%. In the traditional payment structure applied before the
Chinese reforms, employees received increasing pay and benefits (including welfare
housing) according to their tenure, regardless of their performance level, and job
security was guaranteed, thus providing workers with an ‘iron rice bowl’…PFP was
introduced to break the idea of the ‘iron rice bowl,’ as well as the traditional compensa-
tion ideology by creating a strong link between pay and performance.” (Du and Choi,
2010, p. 672).
Du and Choi (2010) argue that in China PFP can be more beneficial to domestic
firms than to foreign firms. This is in part because there is no tradition of an “iron rice
bowl” in foreign-owned firms. In addition, foreign-owned firms typically apply their
existing Human Resource practices that are “characterized by consistent rules and sys-
tematic processes as well as by regular feedback directed to each employee,” whereas
domestically-owned firms “typically do not provide (or even informal) performance re-
views” (p. 676). Du and Choi (2010) find, as do we, that pay-for-performance bonuses
are more intensively used in domestically-owned firms compared to foreign-owned
firms. As noted, foreign-owned firms in our data pay a much lower percent of their pay
in bonuses. Foreign-owned firms, on the other hand, are less likely to pay bonuses and
instead pay a larger proportion of wages as overtime pay.
As we show later in the paper, the bonus-based pay-for-performance structure pro-
vides an additional margin by which Chinese firms can respond to an increase in mini-
mum wages. Specifically, we present evidence that many Chinese firms set the basic
wage equal to the legal minimum wage but pay most workers a bonus that results in
the total wage being higher than the minimum. Then, when minimum wages increase,
employers are able to raise base wages but lower bonuses in order to keep total wages
near the marginal productivity of labor.
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detailed geographic level (county level) on the level of the minimum wage, the dibao (a
cost of living index), and GDP per capita. These data are obtained from local govern-
ment bulletins and websites of the executive branch of human resources and social se-
curity department.5 Compliance with legal minimum wages and overtime pay regulations in
China
5.1 Who earns less than the monthly minimum wage?
In comparing wages to minimum wages, the regulations make it clear the wage in-
cludes any bonuses but excludes overtime pay and legally-mandated supplements. Our
data allow us to exclude overtime pay and include bonuses when we calculate the wage.
As noted above, we cannot distinguish between supplements that are legally required
to be included in the minimum wage and those legally excluded. For this reason we
construct two measures of the wage when comparing to the minimum wage: (1) the
basic wage plus bonuses and (2) the basic wage plus bonuses plus supplements. The
proportion of workers whose basic wage plus bonus is less than the minimum wage will
be an overestimate of the true proportion earning less than the minimum (the esti-
mated proportion will be an upper bound), and the proportion earning less than the
basic wage plus bonus plus supplements will be an underestimate of the true propor-
tion earning less than the minimum (a lower bound estimate of the proportion earning
below the minimum wage). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2
Compared to other developing countries, we find that very few full-time workers earn
less than the monthly legal minimum wage in China. Our upper bound estimate of the
number of workers earning below the minimum wage is 3.4%; our lower bound is 2.1%.
This is similar to the proportion of workers earning below the monthly legal minimum
wage found in other studies using Chinese data. On the other hand, 30% of formal sec-
tor workers in Costa Rica earn below the minimum wage (Gindling and Trejos, 2010),
23% in Nicaragua (Alaniz et al. 2011), almost 20% in Chile (Kanbur et al. 2013), and
45% in Paraguay (Cunningham, 2007). Bhorat et al. (2010) find that 45% of covered
workers get paid wages below the legislated minimum wage in South Africa, Belser and
Rani (2010) report that 25.3% of workers earn below national minimum wage floor and
27.2% of workers below state-level minimum wages in India. Lemos (2006) reports that
the percent of workers whose wage is below the minimum wage in the formal sector in
Brazil is between 5 and 10%, and Harrison and Scorse (2003) report only about half of
all plants paid average wages which exceeded the statutory regional minimum for pro-
duction workers in Indonesia. In nine of the 11 developing economies from Asia, Latin
America, and Africa studied by Rani et al. (2013), non-compliance rates are above 30%.
Only in Vietnam are non-compliance rates as low as those in China, at about 5%. Even
in the United States, one study found that over 25% of workers in textile firms in Los
Angeles earn less than the minimum wage (Weil, 2005).
The proportion of workers earning less than the minimum wage in China is higher
for women than men, for younger and less-experienced workers, and for workers with
less education.12 The proportion of workers earning below the minimum wage is also
substantially higher in firms with owners from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, and in
Table 2 Percent of workers whose monthly wage is below the monthly legal minimum wage
Basic wage + bonus
is below the MW
Basic wage + bonus +




All 3.4 2.1 100
Gender
Male 2.7 1.8 60.5
Female 4.5 2.6 39.5
Educational attainment
College or above 1.1 0.8 9.8
Junior college 1.7 1.1 16.4
High school 2.8 1.7 42.9
Junior high school or below 5.4 2.9 30.9
Age cohort
Age 16–20 6.0 3.8 4.9
Age 21–25 4.1 2.3 15.9
Age 26–30 3.2 1.8 19.2
Age 31+ 2.9 1.7 60.1
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 5.1 2.9 26.8
Experience 4–6 3.4 1.7 15.3
Experience 7–9 2.8 1.4 9.6
Experience 10+ 2.3 1.5 48.3
Position in firm
Office work 5.2 3.9 10.3
Manual worker with junior skill certificate 1.8 1.1 14.1
Manual worker with no skill certificate 5.1 2.8 40.2
Others 1.7 1.2 35.4
Firm ownership
State funded firm 2.8 1.5 15.4
Non-state domestic funded firm 2.9 1.9 61.5
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao funded firm 9.4 4.3 7.8
Foreign funded firm 2.3 1.2 15.4
Firm size
Large 1.8 1.4 29.5
Medium 3.9 2.0 43.3
Small 4.0 2.3 27.3
Region
Beijing 1.9 1.3 14.0
Jiangsu 1.5 0.7 28.1
Shandong 2.8 2.4 28.9
Hubei 1.3 0.6 16.6
Guangdong 15.4 6.9 9.6
Shaanxi 3.4 3.4 2.8
Ascending sort by firm revenue per worker
The first quintile 6.7 2.7 14.4
The second quintile 5.5 2.9 17.4
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Table 2 Percent of workers whose monthly wage is below the monthly legal minimum wage
(Continued)
The third quintile 4.2 2.4 25.4
The fourth quintile 3.7 2.2 24.2
The fifth quintile 3.3 1.9 18.6
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 2.2 1.3 7.8
Communications equipment and computer
manufacturing other electronic equipment
4.9 1.6 6.9
Other manufacturing 3.7 2.3 51.0
Electricity, gas and water production 3.5 2.1 5.2
Construction 1.5 0.9 8.7
Transportation, storage and post service 4.5 2.9 7.3
Wholesale and retail trade (commerce) 1.9 0.7 10.7
Financial service 2.7 2.5 2.5
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workers in our sample (less than 10%). Even for workers with lower productivity, the
percent earning less than the minimum wage is low compared to other countries. For
example, even for workers with the least skills—younger workers and those with less
education and experience—the proportion earning below the minimum wage is less
than 10% when we consider only the basic wage plus bonus, and less than 5% once we
include wage supplements.135.2 Compliance with overtime pay regulations
As noted previously, workers who work more than 40 h per week should be paid at
least 1.5 times their regular hourly wage for the overtime hours that they work (2.0
times on weekends and 3.0 times on holidays). Our data allow us to separate overtime
pay from regular pay (although it does not identify if these overtime hours are on week-
ends or holidays). To examine whether employers are complying with overtime pay
regulations, we examine the following statistics: what percent of workers work more
than 40 h per week but are not paid any overtime pay, what percent of workers are paid
less than 1.5 times the legal minimum wage for the overtime hours that they work,
what percent of workers are paid less than 1.5 times their regular pay for the overtime
hours that they work (Table 3).
Over 41% of workers in our sample work overtime hours. Of these workers, a
substantial fraction did not receive any overtime pay. Almost 29% of workers who
work overtime (12% of all workers) received no overtime pay even though they
worked overtime hours. Over 40% of workers who worked overtime hours (17% of
all workers) received less than 1.5 times the legal minimum wage for their over-
time hours. Finally, 69.5% of workers who work overtime hours (28% of all
workers) earned less than 1.5 times their regular pay for overtime hours. In sum-
mary, while we find evidence of broad compliance with legal minimum wage laws
Table 3 Percent of workers who do not receive legally-mandated overtime pay











smaller than 1.5 times
regular wage
Whose hourly overtime
pay is smaller than 1.5
times hourly minimum
wage
All 41.3 28.6 69.5 41.2
Gender
Male 41.4 29.2 71.7 41.5
Female 41.1 27.3 66.2 40.9
Educational attainment
College or above 26.6 36.5 81.2 46.2
Junior college 34.1 36.4 77.4 46.6
High school 42.3 27.7 68.6 40.2
Junior high school or below 48.9 24.9 65.6 39.7
Age cohort
age 16–20 58 16.9 60.7 35.0
age 21–25 43.7 23.8 68.2 38.9
age 26–30 40.9 26.7 69.2 39.6
age 31+ 39.4 32.0 71.1 43.1
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 49.8 25.3 68.7 42.0
Experience 4–6 41.3 23.5 67.1 36.6
Experience 7–9 41.7 28.3 69.1 40.0
Experience 10+ 36.4 32.7 71.2 42.6
Position in firm
Office work 32.4 35.5 75.6 50.0
Manual worker with junior
skill certificate
42.0 29.8 69.5 42.1
Manual worker with no skill
certificate
47.0 23.2 65.5 36.8
Others 37.1 33.7 73.9 45.0
Firm ownership
State funded firm 31.7 25.2 71.6 40.1
Non-state domestic funded
firm
37.1 38.3 72.5 49.3
Hong-Kong, Taiwan or
Macao funded firm
64.4 15.8 62.6 36.0
Foreign funded firm 53.6 12.9 65.1 24.1
Firm size
Large 39.6 24.7 65.7 37.4
Medium 42.3 26.7 66.9 38.1
Small 41.5 35.4 77.6 50.8
Ascending sort by firm revenue per worker
The first quintile 41.4 33.6 69.6 44.9
The second quintile 42.4 39.4 73.6 49.5
The third quintile 50.6 26.1 70.4 45.3
The fourth quintile 32.8 22.0 70.1 33.8
The fifth quintile 38.5 24.7 63.6 31.4
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62.8 13.7 65.0 30.9
Other manufacturing 45.2 33.2 70.4 48.0
Electricity, gas and water
production
30.6 29.4 71.6 40.2
Construction 27.5 44.7 89.1 53.1
Transportation, storage and
post
42.2 13.3 69.2 17.5
Wholesale and retail
trade(commerce)
21.4 22.0 58.4 29.9
Financial service 22.7 24.2 67.4 30.4
Region
Beijing 34.2 20.2 64.3 28.4
Jiangsu 52.1 18.8 71.8 30.3
Shandong 33.5 49.0 76.1 65.1
Hubei 30.6 32.7 69.3 37.6
Guangdong 59.9 17.9 58.3 40.6
Shaanxi 43.6 56.7 73.2 58.3
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regulations in China.
Table 3 presents evidence that all types of workers are likely to face overtime pay vio-
lations. A high proportion of workers of all education, age, and gender are not paid the
legally-mandated wage for overtime work. Workers who work overtime but paid any
additional wage beyond their regular pay work in both state-owned and privately-
owned firms. Workers in firms with owners from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and for-
eign countries are more likely to work overtime and are also more likely to be paid for
overtime hours, although the overtime pay is still generally less than 1.5 times the regu-
lar wage.
We have presented evidence that while almost all Chinese firms comply with mini-
mum wage laws, many do not comply with overtime pay regulations. As noted in a pre-
vious section of this paper, penalties for violating minimum wage and overtime laws in
China are small. In the vast majority of cases, firms found to be in violation of mini-
mum wage or overtime pay regulations are simply required to pay workers the back
pay owed; no additional fines are imposed. Further, we could find no evidence that
minimum wage laws are enforced more strictly than overtime pay regulations. Given
the low cost of violating these regulations and equal enforcement efforts, it is not likely
that the difference in compliance is due to differential enforcement of minimum wage
and overtime pay regulations.
If differential enforcement is not the reason for differential compliance with mini-
mum wage and overtime laws, then differential compliance is likely due to social or
Ye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:16 Page 16 of 35cultural norms. One thing to remember is that the opening of the Chinese socialist
planned economy to private firms is relatively recent, and labor regulation of pri-
vate firms in China is even more recent. We have noted that the first Chinese
minimum wage regulations were promulgated only in 1994. In the absence of
strong enforcement actions, it may take time for a culture of compliance with
the entire labor code to develop. For several reasons, we believe that it is reason-
able to expect that a culture of compliance with minimum wages has developed
in China, but a culture of compliance with overtime pay has not. Prior to 1994
wages for workers in government-owned firms, in an economy dominated by
government-owned firms, were set by government decree. It required relatively
little change in social norms for workers and employers to accept that the gov-
ernment should have a role in setting wages in the new private sector.14 On the
other hand, there was no history of a 40 h work week in China prior to the 1994
labor regulations. Prior to the 1994 labor regulations, the legal work week in
China was 48 h per week (8 h per day, 6 days per week). The 1994 regulations
even allowed firms some flexibility in implementing the change in working hour
regulations; with the permission of labor authorities, some firms were allowed to
delay implementation of the 40 h work week until 1997. In addition, in rural and
agricultural areas, the home of many Chinese manufacturing workers, working
hours may vary by season, and it was and is common to work more than 5 days
per week and more than 8 h per day during some seasons of the year. Rural mi-
grants employed at the urban manufacturing firms may therefore expect to work
more than 40 h per week. In particular, given a historical 48 h work week, em-
ployees may not protest if asked to work a 48 h week. Even if they are aware
that they should be paid extra for extra work, there is little history in China of
paying more than the regular wage for overtime hours. Prior to the 1994 labor
regulations, firms were required only to pay the same wage for overtime hours as
for regular hours. Thus, employees may still not be aware that overtime pay is







Whose hourly overtime pay is
smaller than 1.5 times regular
wage
Whose hourly overtime pay is smaller
than 1.5 times hourly minimum wage
Percent
of obs.
[40,42] 38.6 62.3 41.7 36.85
[42,44] 24.7 67.8 34.2 15.18
[44,46] 31.8 75.6 44.7 9.9
[46,48] 30.7 81 52.9 13.47
[48,50] 14.6 64.4 29.7 10.12
[50,52] 8.6 74.9 39.1 3.53
[52,54] 16.4 78.9 28.6 2.29
[54,56] 16.9 82.9 47.7 2.19
[56,58] 9 79 44.9 1.64
[58,60] 8.2 77.4 49.6 1.84
>60 14 81.1 47.4 2.98
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pay according to the number of overtime hours that they work. There is a clear discon-
tinuity at 48 h per week. A substantial proportion of workers (around 30% of those
who work overtime hours) work up to 8 h of overtime without pay, while a much
smaller proportion (closer to 15%) work more than 48 h per week without additional
pay. This evidence is consistent with the view that workers are willing to work a few
more hours without pay (at least up to the pre-1994 work week of 48 h per week) but
may balk at working a large number of hours without pay. On the other hand, the pro-
portion of workers earning less than 150% the regular wage or the minimum wage does
not depend on the number of overtime hours worked, suggesting that this legal re-
quirement has not become the social norm.6 Who is likely to be affected by minimum wages?
In the last section we presented evidence that the monthly minimum wage is generally
complied with in China, although overtime pay regulations are not. In this section we
present evidence that, despite widespread compliance with the monthly minimum
wage, the wages of relatively few workers in China are likely to be affected by legal
minimum wages.6.1 Who earns the minimum wage in China?
We find that the relationship between the monthly minimum wage and the wages
paid to workers depends on what wage we consider. Monthly minimum wages
appear to be taken into consideration by many firms when setting the “basic
wage.” However, many workers also receive bonuses. Bonuses are part of the
regular wage and are based on productivity and can vary by worker. We find that
as minimum wages increase from one region to the next, the basic wage in-
creases but bonuses decrease, so that, overall, total wages are not correlated with
the level of minimum wages.
The basic wage of almost 5% of all full-time workers is exactly equal to the
minimum wage for those workers, and the basic wage for 9.3% of all workers is
between the minimum wage and 110% of the minimum wage (Table 5). These
are surprisingly high percentages and suggest that firms consider the minimum
wage when setting the basic wage. However, once supplements and bonuses are
taken into account, this percentage is much smaller; the total full-time wage of
fewer than 1% of the workers in our sample is exactly the minimum wage. The
average increase in the minimum wage is around 10% (Wang, 2012), so looking
at workers earning between the minimum wage and 110% of the minimum wage
is an estimate of the workers likely to be affected by minimum wage changes. By
this measure, we estimate that only between 2.1 and 3.3% of workers will be af-
fected by increases in the minimum wage. Our evidence suggests that many firms
set the basic wage at the monthly minimum and then adjust the monthly wages
of workers upward to the market wage for that worker based on the performance
of that worker. Thus, the evidence suggests that the minimum wage does act as a
wage floor for workers and firms but that the market wage of most workers in
our sample are above the minimum wage.
Table 5 Proportion of workers whose wage equals the minimum wage plus 10%: comparisons to
the basic wage and two measures of the total wage





=MW [1,1.1]MW =MW [1,1.1]MW =MW [1,1.1]MW
All 4.9 9.3 1.3 3.3 0.8 2.1
Gender
Male 4.0 7.7 1.0 2.3 0.6 1.4
Female 6.3 11.9 1.7 4.7 1.1 3.1
Educational attainment
College or above 1.9 3.4 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.2
Junior college 2.9 5.5 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.7
High school 4.8 9.4 1.1 2.9 0.6 1.7
Junior high school or below 7.1 13.2 2.4 5.5 1.7 3.9
Age cohort
Age 16–20 7.4 14.8 2.1 7.4 1.4 4.1
Age 21–25 4.3 9.3 1.2 3.4 0.6 2.0
Age 26–30 4.3 8.3 1.2 2.8 0.6 1.7
Age 31+ 5.0 9.2 1.3 3.0 0.9 2.1
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 6.3 12.0 1.9 5.3 1.2 3.3
Experience 4–6 5.5 10.6 1.8 3.8 1.1 2.5
Experience 7–9 4.1 7.9 1.2 2.8 0.7 1.7
Experience 10+ 4.1 7.8 0.9 2.0 0.5 1.3
Position in firm
Office work 4.4 8.8 0.9 3.8 0.3 2.3
Manual worker with junior skill certificate 5.2 12.2 0.9 4.2 0.4 3.0
Manual worker with no skill certificate 7.2 12.7 2.3 5.4 1.6 3.6
Others 2.0 5.7 0.4 2.1 0.2 1.3
Firm size
Large 2.6 6.7 0.3 1.3 0.2 0.6
Medium 6.1 11.6 1.4 3.8 0.7 2.4
Small 5.5 8.6 2.2 4.5 1.6 3.2
Firm ownership
State funded firm 0.7 4.5 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.8
Non-state domestic funded firm 5.9 9.8 1.4 3.1 1 2.3
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao funded firm 6.1 20 2.9 14.6 1.3 9.7
Foreign funded firm 3.6 9.2 1 3.7 0.4 1.7
Region
Beijing 6.5 10.6 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.5
Jiangsu 9.5 14.2 2.8 5.3 1.5 2.8
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Table 5 Proportion of workers whose wage equals the minimum wage plus 10%: comparisons to
the basic wage and two measures of the total wage (Continued)
Shandong 0.6 4.2 0.3 1.9 0.3 1.4
Hubei 4.6 10.0 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.6
Guangdong 3.7 9.7 2.5 7.3 1.4 5.4
Shaanxi 0.3 2.1 0.3 2.1 0.3 2.1
Ascending sort by firm revenue per worker
The first quintile 6.2 11.3 1.9 5.3 1.5 4.3
The second quintile 5.4 11.6 1.9 4.7 1.4 3.4
The third quintile 3.9 8.7 1 3.1 0.8 2.1
The fourth quintile 6.6 10 1.7 2.7 0.4 0.9
The fifth quintile 2.4 5.7 0.3 1.2 0.2 0.6
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 12 19.5 3.8 6.6 2.9 4.8
Communications equipment and computer
manufacturing other electronic equipment
6.5 14 2.2 7.7 0.9 4.3
Other manufacturing 3.7 8.5 1.1 2.8 0.5 1.6
Electricity, gas and water production 0.7 3.3 0 1.1 0 0.2
Construction 3.1 4.3 0.4 1 0.3 0.7
Transportation, storage and post 5.3 6.5 1.4 2.4 1.3 1.9
Wholesale and retail trade (commerce) 8.4 13.3 1.4 3.6 1.2 2.8
Financial service 1.6 3.6 1.2 2.3 1.2 2.1
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each worker and the minimum wage (Fig. 1) are also consistent with the conclu-
sion that employers consider minimum wages when setting the basic wage but
that market wages are above the minimum wage for almost all workers. A value
of zero in these figures indicates that the wage is equal to the minimum wage
for these workers. There is a clear spike in the distribution of the basic wage at
the level of the minimum wage and a censoring of the basic wage below the
minimum, indicating that employers consider the minimum wage to be a wage
floor when setting the regular monthly wage. However, the distributions of the
total full-time wage (wage plus bonus and wage plus bonus plus supplements) ap-
pear to be only slightly affected by the minimum wage, with no clear spike at the
minimum wage and only some censoring of the distribution below the minimum
wage.
Women are more likely to earn the minimum wage than men (see Table 5). Younger,
less skilled, less experienced, and less-educated workers are also more likely to earn the
legal minimum. These low-skilled workers are likely to have low market wages. These
are also the types of workers that we found are more likely to be paid below the mini-
mum wage.
Workers in firms located in Guangdong province, in low revenue per worker (labor
intensive) firms and in apparel, textile, and electronic equipment manufacturing are
more likely to be earning the minimum wage. The category of firms with the highest
Fig. 1 For all workers: kernel density graphs for basic wage, basic wage plus bonus and total wage
compared to minimum wage
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Ye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:16 Page 21 of 35percentage of workers likely to be affected by minimum wages are those with owners
from Taiwan, Macao, or Hong Kong. These firms tend to be, not surprisingly, labor in-
tensive firms that manufacture apparel, textiles, and electronic equipment and are likely
to depend heavily on exports.
However, even for groups that are likely to have low market wages, the percent of
workers in our sample earning within 10% of the minimum wage is small. Using our
upper bound of the estimates (the comparison with the basic wage plus the bonus), the
highest proportion of workers earning within 10% of the minimum wage are for youn-
gest workers (7.4% for teenagers), those with a junior high school education or below
(5.5%), workers in Guangdong province (7.3%), textile and apparel workers (6.6%), elec-
tronics manufacturing workers (7.7%), and workers in firms with the lowest revenue
per worker.15 A very high percent of workers in firms with owners from Hong Kong,
Macao, or Taiwan, almost 15% using our upper-bound estimates, earn within 10% of
the minimum wage. However, these workers represent only 7.8% of our sample (see
Table 1).6.2 Regression analysis comparing wages with the minimum wage
To further explore the relationship between the different components of the wage
and the minimum wage, we regress different components of the wage on the
level of the minimum wage, controlling for personal characteristics, firm charac-
teristics, and the regional characteristics. We are interested in discovering if the
different types of wages for each worker are correlated with the level of the mini-
mum wage in each local geographic region. We examine the impact of minimum
wages on three types/components of the wage: (1) the basic wage, (2) the bonus,
(3) the total full-time wage (basic wage plus bonus plus supplement). We also
examine the impact of minimum wages on hours worked, which, because our
data is for full-time workers only, will be an indicator of over-time hours. Per-
sonal characteristics that we control for include gender, age and age squared, ex-
perience and experience squared, a set of education dummy variables (high
school, junior college and college or above, where the excluded category is junior
high or below), and a set of occupational dummy variables. Firm characteristics
that we control for include firm ownership dummies, firm size dummies, the rev-
enue per worker, the labor cost to total expenditure ratio16, and the wage to
other labor cost ratio. Regional characteristics that we control for are those that
the minimum wage laws require local governments to consider when setting the
minimum wage, and include an index of cost of living, average county-level
wages, and the county GDP. Estimated errors are adjusted for clustering around
firms. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6.
We find that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the
minimum wage and the basic wage. However, we find a statistically negative cor-
relation between the minimum wage and bonus. For most workers, the higher
basic wage and lower bonus cancel each other out so that we find that higher
minimum wages are not significantly correlated with total full-time wages.
The coefficient on the log of minimum wages in the equation where the
dependent variable is the log of basic wage is 0.9, suggesting that a 1% increase
Table 6 Wage regressions
Coefficients on each explanatory variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Log of minimum wage 0.872*** −6.299*** −0.015 0.048
(0.212) (1.739) (0.111) (0.037)
Log of lowest living cost −0.305* 3.881*** 0.150 −0.009
(0.170) (1.399) (0.092) (0.025)
Log of county level average
wage
0.280*** 1.923*** 0.519*** −0.007
(0.070) (0.462) (0.043) (0.008)
Log of county level GDP per
capita
0.004 0.351 0.045* −0.012*
(0.041) (0.379) (0.026) (0.006)
Female −0.090*** −0.117 −0.116*** −0.008***
(0.011) (0.079) (0.007) (0.002)
College or above 0.483*** 0.735*** 0.513*** −0.034***
(0.033) (0.212) (0.023) (0.004)
Junior college 0.213*** 0.391** 0.244*** −0.023***
(0.022) (0.171) (0.017) (0.004)
High school 0.050*** 0.126 0.083*** −0.009**
(0.018) (0.148) (0.012) (0.004)
Age 0.021*** 0.031 0.024*** −0.001
(0.006) (0.038) (0.005) (0.001)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000 −0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.012*** 0.018 0.011*** −0.002**
(0.004) (0.028) (0.003) (0.001)
Experience squared −0.000*** −0.000 −0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
State funded firm −0.080 0.656 0.016 0.005
(0.059) (0.506) (0.043) (0.008)
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao
funded firm
0.120** −0.717 0.022 0.051***
(0.054) (0.490) (0.035) (0.013)
Foreign funded firm 0.228*** 0.298 0.131*** 0.025***
(0.059) (0.510) (0.033) (0.009)
Large size firm −0.094* 1.611*** 0.097*** −0.016**
(0.052) (0.465) (0.032) (0.008)
Medium size firm −0.022 0.513* 0.060*** 0.001
(0.031) (0.264) (0.019) (0.006)
Log of firm revenue per worker 0.077*** 0.323** 0.096*** 0.002
(0.015) (0.127) (0.011) (0.003)
Proportion of labor cost to total
expenditure
0.250*** −0.563 0.234*** −0.021
(0.096) (0.774) (0.061) (0.014)
−0.096 1.353** −0.054 −0.045***
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Table 6 Wage regressions (Continued)
Other labor cost to wage
expenditure
(0.069) (0.573) (0.042) (0.011)
Dummies for position in firm YES YES YES YES
Dummies for sectors YES YES YES YES
Observations 514497 521501 521074 521501
R2 0.350 0.228 0.556 0.139
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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basic wage. The coefficient in the bonus equation is a −6.3, suggesting that a 1%
increase in the minimum wage leads to an approximately 6% drop in bonus pay-
ments. Because bonuses are only 20% of earnings while the basic wage is 60%, a
1% change in the basic wage is a much bigger absolute increase than a 1%
change in the bonus. This can easily be seen if we assume that the total wage is
100 (so that the basic wage is 60 and the bonus is 20). In this case, our results
from Table 6 predict that a 1% increase in the minimum wage would lead to an
increase in the basic wage of approximately 0.54 (0.9% of 60) and a drop in the
bonus by 1.2 (6% of 20).
Because we have data on firms at only one point in time, we can only examine
correlations across regions. It is possible that our regressions are not capturing the
causal effect of minimum wages on wages, but instead are capturing the effect of
local labor market conditions on both minimum wages and the actual wages paid to
workers. We try to control for this by including indicators of local labor market
conditions as control variables, but we may not have data on all the factors that
affect the setting of minimum wages and actual wages. However, if both the
minimum wage and actual wages move in the same direction because of local labor
market conditions, then both bonuses and basic wages should be positively corre-
lated with minimum wages. Contrary to this expectation, we find that bonuses are
negatively correlated with minimum wages across regions. This suggests that our
regression results are not due to omitted variables relating to economic conditions
in each region.
While we find that total full-time wages are not correlated with minimum
wages for workers in general, it is possible that there is a correlation for some
sub-sets of workers. For example, we found earlier in the paper that the propor-
tion of workers earning at or below the minimum wage is higher for women
compared to men, for less-skilled and less-educated workers, for younger and
less-experienced workers, for workers in firms with low revenue per worker
(labor-intensive firms), for firms whose owners are from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or
Macao, and for firms in Guangdong province. Controlling for personal, firm, and
regional characteristics, we examine whether minimum wages are statistically sig-
nificantly correlated with wages for these sub-groups. The regression results for
different sub-groups of workers are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 Wage regression results: coefficients on the log of the minimum wage for different
groups of workers
Coefficients on the minimum wage variable only
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Male 1.008*** −5.386*** 0.095 0.052
(0.228) (1.748) (0.119) (0.037)
Female 0.746*** −7.792*** −0.143 0.046
(0.224) (1.928) (0.119) (0.041)
Educational attainment
College or above 0.640** −10.684*** −0.410 0.068*
(0.305) (3.232) (0.325) (0.041)
Junior college 1.177*** −8.171*** 0.142 0.013
(0.264) (1.979) (0.180) (0.040)
High school 1.081*** −6.191*** 0.177 0.014
(0.238) (1.833) (0.109) (0.036)
Junior high school
or below
0.836*** −5.204*** −0.014 0.081
(0.206) (2.000) (0.121) (0.052)
Age cohort
Age 16–20 1.134*** −9.679*** −0.122 0.094
(0.349) (2.408) (0.163) (0.073)
Age 21–25 1.029*** −9.606*** −0.014 0.075
(0.290) (2.013) (0.127) (0.051)
Age 26–30 0.791*** −7.723*** −0.071 0.073*
(0.234) (1.777) (0.127) (0.039)
Age 31+ 0.834*** −5.093*** 0.026 0.031
(0.206) (1.787) (0.119) (0.035)
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 0.984*** −10.118*** −0.091 0.083
(0.251) (1.856) (0.144) (0.058)
Experience 4–6 0.403 −5.396*** −0.169 0.070
(0.269) (1.854) (0.149) (0.048)
Experience 7–9 0.634*** −7.599*** −0.032 0.086**
(0.229) (2.042) (0.131) (0.034)
Experience 10+ 0.964*** −4.547** 0.109 −0.011
(0.242) (2.091) (0.132) (0.036)
Position in firm
Office workers 1.133*** −10.192*** −0.046 −0.020
(0.366) (2.014) (0.251) (0.040)
Manual workers with
no skill certificate
0.649*** −6.852*** −0.032 0.139***
(0.233) (2.100) (0.134) (0.050)
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Table 7 Wage regression results: coefficients on the log of the minimum wage for different
groups of workers (Continued)
Firm ownership
State funded firm 1.141* −8.059** 0.456 0.010
(0.668) (3.721) (0.454) (0.119)
Non-state domestic funded
firm
0.998*** −4.502** 0.074 0.041
(0.237) (2.152) (0.124) (0.044)
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao
funded firm
0.398 −19.374*** −0.198 0.243
(0.462) (5.027) (0.379) (0.177)
Foreign funded firm 1.185* −9.291*** 0.555 −0.032
(0.625) (3.079) (0.453) (0.124)
Firm size
Large 0.796 −5.563 0.393 0.038
(0.773) (5.963) (0.404) (0.083)
Medium 0.702** −5.769*** 0.003 0.039
(0.283) (2.185) (0.161) (0.060)
Small 0.486** −1.597 0.165 0.119**
(0.204) (1.688) (0.145) (0.048)
Labor intensive firms: ascending sort by firm revenue per worker
The first quintile 1.221*** −2.924 0.907*** 0.127*
(0.229) (2.594) (0.206) (0.073)
The second quintile 0.222 −4.986 0.115 0.006
(0.424) (3.522) (0.274) (0.064)
The third quintile 0.674 −4.517* −0.279* −0.033
(0.410) (2.617) (0.163) (0.086)
The fourth quintile 0.615 −10.761*** −0.267 0.208***
(0.387) (3.338) (0.220) (0.060)
The fifth quintile 1.114*** −6.757** 0.157 0.074*
(0.395) (2.715) (0.287) (0.041)
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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positively correlated with the basic wage but negatively correlated with the bonus. For
most sub-groups of workers, the higher basic wage and lower bonus cancel each other
out, and the minimum wage is not significantly correlated with the total wage. How-
ever, there are some types of workers for whom higher minimum wages are signifi-
cantly correlated with higher total wages. These are workers in the most labor-intensive
(with the lowest revenue per worker) firms. We do not find a significant correlation be-
tween minimum wages and total wages for any other sub-group of workers, only for
workers in the most labor-intensive firms.
We have noted that most workers who work overtime hours do not receive the
legally-mandated 150% of their regular pay for overtime work and that close to
29% receive no pay at all for overtime hours. This suggests that if employers are
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by increasing over-time hours. As we have shown that higher minimum wages
are likely to affect only the least-skilled workers in the most labor-intensive firms,
we would expect any hours worked effect of minimum wages to be primarily
among these workers. We examine this possibility by replacing the log of wage
with the log of hours worked as the dependent variable in the regressions. The
results are presented in the fourth column of Tables 6 and 7. For almost all sub-
sets of workers, higher minimum wages are positively correlated with higher
hours worked, although for most subsets of workers this correlation is not statis-
tically significant. Minimum wages are significantly correlated with greater hours
worked for the workers we identified as most likely to earn near the minimum
wage, the least skilled workers (i.e., manual workers with no skills) in the most
labor-intensive firms.17
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use matched firm-employee data on over 500,000 workers to exam-
ine whether firms comply with legal minimum wages and other pay regulations in
China. We find evidence that there is broad compliance with minimum wages in
China in that very few full-time workers earn less than the monthly minimum wage.
Specifically, we estimate that fewer than 3.5% of full-time workers in China earn less
than the monthly minimum wage compared to 20–45% of workers that published
studies report earn less than the legal minimum wage in many other developing
economies.
Despite widespread compliance with monthly legal minimum wages, we present
evidence that few workers are likely to see their total wages change when
minimum wages increase. This is because the minimum wage is below the market
wage for almost all of the Chinese workers in our sample. Workers in formal
sector firms in China are paid a “basic wage” plus supplements for transportation,
risk, etc., plus a bonus related to productivity. All workers with the same position
in the same firm (who do the same job) receive the same basic wage, which is
determined prior to performing the work. Bonuses, on the other hand, depend on
performance, may differ between workers in the same position in the firm, and
are not determined until after the work is performed. Minimum wages appear to
be taken into consideration by many firms when setting the basic wage. We find
that basic wages are set at exactly the minimum wage for a relatively large
fraction of workers. However, once bonuses and supplements are taken into ac-
count, almost all workers earn more than the minimum wage. We also find that
there is a positive correlation between the minimum wage and the basic wage.
On the other hand, we find that there is a negative correlation between the
minimum wage and the bonus. For most workers, the higher basic wage and
lower bonus cancel each other out and the minimum wage is not significantly
correlated with the total wage. Only for workers in the most labor-intensive firms
and low profit/revenue firms are higher minimum wages significantly correlated
with higher total wages. These firms, where workers are most likely to be af-
fected by legal minimum wages, are disproportionately export-oriented firms
located in the more developed eastern Chinese provinces such as Guangdong.
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wage, many workers are not paid the legally-mandated minimum for overtime
hours. Specifically, we find that over 29% of the workers in our sample who work
more than 40 h per week are paid nothing for the additional hours of work. Of
those who are paid, most are not paid legally-mandated overtime pay; over 40%
of the employees who work overtime are paid less than 1.5 times the legal mini-
mum wage for these hours of overtime work, and almost 70% are paid less than
the legally-mandated 1.5 times regular pay. Since 41% of workers in our sample
work more than 40 h per week, this implies that formal sector firms in China do
not pay legally-mandated overtime pay to over 26% of all employees. All types of
firms, including state-owned firms, are likely to violate overtime pay laws.
Lack of compliance with overtime pay regulations suggests that if employers
are faced with higher costs because of higher minimum wages, then they may
compensate by requiring workers to work more hours. We examine this possibil-
ity by regressing hours worked on the minimum wage. We find that higher mini-
mum wages are significantly correlated with greater hours worked for workers in
the most labor-intensive firms and for the least skilled workers.
The literature on the labor market impacts of minimum wages in China reports
small and non-robust negative wage and employment effects. The results pre-
sented in this paper help to explain why the impact of minimum wages is small
in China despite widespread compliance with minimum wage laws. First, we
present evidence that the impact of minimum wages on the wages paid to
workers depends on the wage considered. Specifically, we present evidence that
minimum wages are correlated with basic wages but that most workers in China
are paid performance-based bonuses that cause the total full-time monthly wage
of workers to be above the legal minimum wage. When minimum wages increase,
our results suggest that firms increase the basic wage but lower bonuses so that
total full-time wages stay the same. Second, we find that the minimum wage does
affect the wages of some workers, specifically the lowest-skilled workers in the
most labor-intensive firms. However, our results suggest that for these workers
firms adjust to the higher labor costs not by reducing the level of employment,
but by increasing hours worked.
Our results also have implications for attempts to improve the earnings of low-
wage workers in China through increased compliance with labor protection regula-
tions. Specifically, the focus of inspectors and others should be on improving
compliance with over-time pay regulations as well as compliance with legal mini-
mum wages.Endnotes
1What should be included in minimum wage paid to workers may also be
different in different provinces. For example, minimum wages in Beijing, Shang-
hai, and Jiangxi provinces do not include the employee payments to social secur-
ity or housing provident funds. In China, social security payments and housing
provident funds are co-paid by employee and employer. The employer portion of
social security payments and housing provident funds are excluded from the wage
Ye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:16 Page 28 of 35calculation in all provinces. Minimum wages in Jiangsu province include social
security payments by the employee but not housing provident funds.
2The structural hierarchy of the administrative divisions of the People's Republic of
China is as follows: Provincial level, Prefectural City level, County level. Currently,
Chinese mainland administers 33 provincial level regions, 333 prefectural level regions,
2,862 county-level regions.
3The highest monthly minimum wage level is 1000 yuan, the lowest monthly
minimum wage level is 390 yuan, and the mean monthly minimum wage level is
642 yuan. On November 17, 2008 the Department of Human Resources and So-
cial Securities instructed local governments to restrain from increasing minimum
wages in 2009 as a way to ease the negative influence of an international finan-
cial crisis. This implies that the minimum wage enforced in 2009 was set in 2008
or 2007.
4For example, Article 85 of the Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China, adopted in 2007, states "The labor administration authority… shall order
the employer to pay labor remunerations if overtime pay or economic compensa-
tion is not provided within the prescribed period of time. Where the standard of
labor remuneration is lower than the local minimum wage rate the employer shall
be ordered to make up the balance. When due payment is not made within the
time limit, the employer shall be ordered to pay additional damages to the em-
ployee" (authors’ translation).
5Not all violations of labor regulations are treated as leniently. For example, fines
are imposed on firms if it is found that they have hired children under 16 years old.
6Our summary of the behavior of labor inspections in practice is derived from
interviews with former and current labor department officials and academics who study
labor law. Those interviewed included Hainan Su, a Beijing Normal University
professor and former official of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,
Chengbao Xu, an official in the Nanjing Human Resources and Social Security
Department and Jianguo Qin, associate professor of finance and economics at the
Nanjing University of Economics and Finance.
7The source of the information in this paragraph is Hainan Su, a Beijing Normal
University professor and former official of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security and Chengbao Xu, an official in the Nanjing Human Resources and Social Se-
curity Department.
8For example, Article 85, Article 90, and Article 91. Article 91 states that “when
an employing unit infringes on any of the following legitimate rights and interests
of laborers, the labor administrative department shall order it to pay laborers remu-
neration or to make up for economic losses” if firms do the following: “(1) deduct
wages or delay paying wages to laborers without reason, (2) refuse to pay laborers
for extended working hours, to pay laborers wages below the local standard on
minimum wages, or to fail to provide laborers with economic compensations in
accordance with the provisions of this law after revocation of labor contracts”
(authors’ translation).
9The term “rural migrant” in China refers to workers whose legal residence
(citizenship or “hukou”) is in rural areas but who are temporary migrants to urban
areas. Under the “hukou” (household registration) system, social services, such as
Ye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:16 Page 29 of 35government-subsidized health care, education, and pension, are available to workers
only in their legal residence. Rural migrants generally return to their legal residence in
rural areas to access these services, for holidays, and when they leave their jobs in
urban areas. It is difficult to change your legal residence. Rural migrants tend to earn
less than citizens of urban areas, and one key motivation for the introduction of legal
minimum wages was to protect rural migrant workers.
10The capital city of the province is always the most developed city in this province
in China.
11Table 9 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics for the data we use.
Table 10 compares summary statistics from our sample to summary statistics from
the 2008 National Economic Census of China. These comparisons show that the
distributions of workers by gender and education level are similar for our sample
and the census. Our sample includes slightly fewer workers with a college and jun-
ior high school education compared to the census, and slightly more with a high
school education. Compared to the census, our sample includes slightly more
workers in manufacturing firms (66% vs. 63%), electricity gas and water produc-
tion (5% vs. 1.5%) and transportation, storage and post (7% vs. 5%), and fewer
workers in construction (8.5% vs. 18%). Our sample also includes more state-
owned and foreign-owned firms and fewer non-state domestically owned firms. In
the body of the paper, we always report our results separately for different gen-
ders and education levels and for firms of different ownership types and different
industry sectors.
12Unfortunately, we cannot identify rural migrants in our data, nor do we have data
on the exports of firms.
13Labor regulations in Beijing and Jiangsu provinces mandate excluding add-
itional supplements when comparing the wage to the minimum wage. Taking
these special rules into account does not change our results dramatically. For ex-
ample, when we adjust the wage and minimum wage for the regulations specific
to these two provinces, the proportion of workers earning less than the minimum
wage increases from 1.3 to 3.7% in Beijing and from 1.5 to 3.6% in Jiangsu (see
Table 8).
14This may also help explain why foreign-owned firms are more likely to violate mini-
mum wage laws and more likely to pay for overtime.
15Particularly striking is that 12% of workers in apparel and textile manufacturing
have basic wages equal to exactly the minimum wage, although half of these worker
earn bonuses and supplements that cause total wages to be above the minimum.
16We include revenue per worker as an indicator of the labor intensity of the
firm, while we include both labor cost to total expenditure, we do not believe
that this is a good indicator of the labor intensity of the firm. This is because
many labor intensive firms are export-oriented electronic assembly or apparel
firms where the cost of the imported parts to be assembled are a large part of
firm expenditures. Therefore, even though these assembly firms are labor inten-
sive, the labor cost to total expenditure is low.
17This result is consistent with the finding in Yang et al. (2014) that higher minimum
wages for rural migrants lead to higher total monthly earnings and hours worked but
lower hourly wages. Interestingly, we also find that higher minimum wages are
Table 8 Beijing and Jiangsu: Percent of workers whose monthly wage is below not adjusted and
adjusted monthly legal minimum wage
Basic wage + bonus is
below the MW
Basic wage + bonus +
supplements is below
MW
Not adjusted Adjusteda Not adjusted Adjusteda
All 1.8 6.0 1.1 3.7
Gender
Male 1.5 4.6 1.0 3.0
Female 2.2 8.1 1.3 4.6
Educational attainment
College or above 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.7
Junior college 1.3 2.5 0.7 1.4
High school 1.8 5.6 1.1 3.4
Junior high school or below 2.5 10.0 1.6 6.2
Age cohort
Age 16–20 3.7 11.9 2.8 8.2
Age 21–25 2.5 6.4 1.5 3.5
Age 26–30 1.7 5.2 1.1 2.8
Age 31+ 1.5 5.7 0.9 3.6
Experience cohort
Experience 1–3 3.3 9.8 2.3 6.3
Experience 4–6 1.7 6.9 1.0 3.8
Experience 7–9 1.3 5.1 0.6 2.7
Experience 10+ 1.0 3.5 0.6 2.2
Position in firm
Manual work 4.6 6.9 3.4 4.6
Worker with junior skill certificate 0.6 3.3 0.4 1.5
Worker with no skill certificate 2.2 9.5 1.3 5.9
Others 0.8 2.1 0.4 1.1
Firm ownership
State funded firm 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.4
Non-state domestic funded firm 2.2 6.7 1.4 4.6
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao funded firm 1.0 8.1 0.5 2.3
Foreign funded firm 1.4 4.8 1.1 2.8
Firm size
Large 1.4 3.0 1.1 1.5
Medium 2.0 7.0 1.1 4.1
Small 1.8 7.0 1.2 4.8
Labor intensive firms: ascending sort by firm revenue per worker
The first quintile 5.9 13.8 4.1 9.1
The second quintile 3.3 10.2 2.6 7.6
The third quintile 1.4 6.4 0.8 3.9
The fourth quintile 0.6 3.9 0.2 1.4
The fifth quintile 1.0 2.4 0.5 1.3
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Table 8 Beijing and Jiangsu: Percent of workers whose monthly wage is below not adjusted and
adjusted monthly legal minimum wage (Continued)
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 1.4 8.8 1.3 6.1
Communications equipment, computer manufacturing 2.6 7.5 1.8 5.7
Other manufacturing 1.3 5.7 0.7 2.8
Electricity, gas and water production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 1.3 2.9 0.6 1.6
Transportation, storage and post 4.9 9.1 4.0 7.2
Wholesale and retail trade(commerce) 2.5 6.0 1.1 4.1
Financial service 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
aIn Beijing, adjusted wages exclude the employee contribution to social insurance and housing provision funds. In
Jiangsu, adjusted wages exclude only housing provision funds
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics
Variables Number of obs Mean Min Max
Personal level variables
Wages
Mean monthly total wage (yuan) 521501 2657 320 82000
Mean monthly basic wage (yuan) 521501 1592 0 82000
Mean monthly bonus (yuan) 521501 682 0 75438
Mean monthly supplements (yuan) 521501 199 0 67035
Mean monthly overtime pay (yuan) 521501 185 0 29042
Gender
Proportion female 521501 0.395 0 1
Educational attainment (proportion or workers at each level)
College or above 521501 0.109 0 1
Junior college 521501 0.164 0 1
High school 521501 0.420 0 1
Junior high school or below 521501 0.306 0 1
Age (mean) 521501 34 16 65
Experience (mean) 521501 12 1 50
Position in firm (proportion of workers at each level)
Office work 521501 0.103 0 1
Manual worker with junior skill certificate 521501 0.141 0 1
Manual worker with no skill certificate 521501 0.402 0 1
Others 521501 0.354 0 1
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 521501 0.082 0 1
Communications equipment, computer manufacturing 521501 0.069 0 1
Other manufacturing 521501 0.508 0 1
Electricity, gas and water production 521501 0.051 0 1
Construction 521501 0.085 0 1
Transportation, storage and post 521501 0.073 0 1
Wholesale and retail trade(commerce) 521501 0.106 0 1
Financial service 521501 0.026 0 1
Firm level variables
Mean yearly average number of employees 2835 361 1 41500
Firm ownership (proportion of firms)
State funded firm 2835 0.095 0 1
Non-state domestic funded firm 2835 0.708 0 1
HongKong, Taiwan, Macao funded firm 2835 0.075 0 1
Foreign funded firm 2835 0.122 0 1
Firm size (proportion of firms)
Large 2835 0.057 0 1
Medium 2835 0.230 0 1
Small 2835 0.713 0 1
Firm revenue per worker (mean)(unit:10,000yuan) 2835 114.98 0.02 12649
Proportion of labor cost to total expenditure (mean) 2835 0.224 0 1
Other labor cost to wage expenditure (mean) 2835 0.415 0 1
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics (Continued)
Firm profit per worker (mean)(unit:10,000yuan) 2835 3.980 −20 100
Industry sectors
Apparel and textile products manufacturing 2835 0.058 0 1
Communications equipment, computer manufacturing 2835 0.066 0 1
Other manufacturing 2835 0.403 0 1
Electricity, gas and water production 2835 0.042 0 1
Construction 2835 0.129 0 1
Transportation, storage and post 2835 0.053 0 1
Wholesale and retail trade(commerce) 2835 0.217 0 1
Financial service 2835 0.033 0 1
Region(County level)variables
Monthly minimum wage 249 655 450 1000
Yearly lowest living cost 249 3147 1680 4980
County level average wage 249 25181 3842 93009
County level GDP per capita 249 44380 6526 255346
Table 10 Comparing summary statistics from our sample with the 2008 National Economic census
Sample Census
Variables Mean Standard error Mean
Worker level variables
Gender
Proportion female 0.395 0.489 0.376
Educational attainment (proportion or workers at each level)
College or above 0.109 0.312 0.124
Junior college 0.164 0.371 0.165
High school 0.42 0.494 0.334
Junior high school or below 0.306 0.461 0.377
Industry sectors
Manufacturing 0.659 0.474 0.630
Electricity, gas and water production 0.051 0.220 0.015
Construction 0.085 0.279 0.181
Transportation, storage and post 0.073 0.260 0.050
Wholesale and retail trade(commerce) 0.106 0.307 0.101
Financial service 0.026 0.160 0.023
Firm level variables
Firm ownership (proportion of firms)
State funded firm 0.095 0.293 0.029
Non-state domestic funded firm 0.708 0.455 0.922
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao funded firm 0.075 0.263 0.025
Foreign funded firm 0.122 0.327 0.024
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Ye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:16 Page 34 of 35significantly correlated with higher hours worked for workers in the least labor inten-
sive firms and for college graduates.
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